Multi-agent Justification Logic: communication and evidence elimination by Bryan Renne
Synthese (2012) 185:43–82
Knowledge, Rationality & Action 373–412
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9968-7
Multi-agent Justification Logic: communication
and evidence elimination
Bryan Renne
Received: 25 March 2010 / Accepted: 2 June 2011 / Published online: 5 July 2011
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper presents a logic combining Dynamic Epistemic Logic, a frame-
work for reasoning about multi-agent communication, with a new multi-agent version
of Justification Logic, a framework for reasoning about evidence and justification. This
novel combination incorporates a new kind of multi-agent evidence elimination that
cleanly meshes with the multi-agent communications from Dynamic Epistemic Logic,
resulting in a system for reasoning about multi-agent communication and evidence
elimination for groups of interacting rational agents.
Keywords Justification Logic · Dynamic Epistemic Logic · Evidence elimination
1 Introductory example
Consider the following email exchange among friends planning a party.
x1
{
To: Bob, Charlie From: Anne
If the cheese store is still open, then I’ll bring the cheese tonight.
x2
{
To: Anne, Bob From: Charlie Re: x1
OK, Anne. If you bring the cheese, then I’ll bring the crackers.
x3
{
To: Bob, Charlie From: Anne
I just checked. The cheese store is still open!
x4
{
To: Anne, Bob From: Charlie Re: x3
It’s great the store’s still open! I’ll go get the crackers.
After this sequence of messages, Bob and Charlie are each able to conclude that
Anne is bringing the cheese. After all, each of Bob and Charlie has message x1 as
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evidence that “Anne will bring the cheese if the store is open” along with message x3
as evidence that the store is indeed open. So by combining their evidence x1 and x3,
they each have evidence that Anne will bring the cheese.
Furthermore, since Charlie replied to each of Anne’s messages x1 and x3 with his
own messages x2 and x4, which indicates that Charlie has received and understood
each of Anne’s messages, Bob not only has his combined evidence x1 and x3 that
Anne will bring the cheese but can also see on the basis of Charlie’s messages x2 and
x4 that Charlie too has combined evidence x1 and x3 to conclude that Anne will bring
the cheese.




To: Bob From: Anne
Bob, I messed up! The store is closed! Charlie is going to flip!
Clearly, this message has the effect of causing Bob to set aside (or eliminate) his
evidence x3 relevant to the assertion that the store is open. But since x5 was sent pri-
vately to Bob,1 Bob has no reason to believe that Charlie will doubt the evidence x3 that
the store is open. Therefore, while message x5 causes Bob to eliminate his evidence
x3 relevant to the assertion that the store is open—and so to abandon his combined
evidence x1 and x3 that Anne is bringing the cheese—Bob will nevertheless maintain
his belief based on the combination of evidence x2 and x4 that Charlie still believes
based on the combination of evidence x1 and x3 that Anne will bring the cheese.
2 Introduction
As indicated by our email example, this paper concerns reasoning about multi-agent
communication and evidence elimination. Our work here is part of a larger project
aimed at joining two areas of study: Justification Logic,2 a family of logics for rea-
soning about evidence and justification, and Dynamic Epistemic Logic,3 a family of
logics for reasoning about multi-agent communication and belief. Before we discuss
our rationale for seeking a combination of these theories, let us first say a few words
about each of them in isolation.
Justification Logic has been promoted as a logic for reasoning about evidence and
justification (Artemov 2008; Fitting 2009). The idea here is to remedy a deficiency
found in the standard use of modal logic for reasoning about the justifications agents
have for the beliefs that they possess. To illustrate this deficiency, consider a valid
modal formula of the form Biϕ → Biψ , where Bi is a modal operator and each of ϕ
and ψ are formulas. This formula, read, “if agent i believes ϕ, then agent i believes
ψ ,” stipulates a certain connection between agent i believing one thing, ψ , and agent
1 For simplicity, we assume that neither CC (“carbon copy”) nor BCC (“blind carbon-copy”) is possible.
The recipients of a message are therefore those individuals mentioned in the “To” field.
2 See: Artemov (2001, 2008); Artemov and Nogina (2005); Fitting (2005, 2009); Kuznets (2008); Renne
(2008a).
3 See: Baltag and Moss (2004); Baltag et al. (1998, 2008); Renne (2008b); van Benthem (2006)
van Benthem et al. (2006); van Ditmarsch et al. (2007).
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i believing another thing, ϕ. But we see that this formula does not provide a reason as
to why agent i’s belief in one thing follows whenever he or she has belief in another.
The formula merely asserts that such conditional belief holds without providing any
explanation as to why this is the case.
Justification Logic aims to better explicate this situation by first introducing struc-
tured syntactic objects called terms and then allowing us to form new formulas of the
form t :i ϕ whenever t is a term, i is an agent, and ϕ is a formula we have already
formed. The idea is to identify the structure of the term t with an abstract descrip-
tion of a derivation within a given theory of Justification Logic in a way that satisfies
the Internalization Theorem (Artemov 2001): if p is a proof of a theorem χ in the
logic, then there is a systematic way to construct a term u p whose structure reflects
the structure of p such that u p :i χ is also a theorem of the logic. This provides us
with a proof-based notion of evidence, in the sense that the appearance of a term t in
a theorem t :i ϕ encodes a description as to why it is (according to the theory) that
agent i believes that ϕ holds. This leads us to read the formula t :i ϕ as “t is agent i’s
evidence that ϕ is true.”
Returning to the deficiency of modal logic, Justification Logic enables us to replace
the statement Biϕ → Biψ of conditional (modal) belief with a more nuanced state-
ment of conditional evidence-based belief: for a term st built up from t , the formula
t :i ϕ → st :i ψ says, “if t is agent i’s evidence forϕ, then st is agent i’s evidence forψ .”
Since st is built up from t , we see that this tells us that in case agent i has justification t
for his or her belief in ϕ, then agent i may justify his or her belief in ψ by inserting the
argument t into the appropriate places in the argument st , thereby yielding an argument
supporting ψ . In this way, Justification Logics provide an in-language notion of proof-
based evidence. To distinguish this notion of evidence from other notions of evidence,
it may be helpful to think of proof-based evidence in the following intuitive way: to
have proof-based evidence for ϕ is to have deductive argumentation supporting ϕ.
One immediate limitation for the proof-based notion of evidence found in many
Justification Logics is that it is static: in these theories, either agent i has an argument
supporting ϕ, in which case he or she has and will always have evidence for ϕ, or
else agent i does not have an argument supporting ϕ, in which case he or she does not
and will never have evidence for ϕ. Such Justification Logics do not allow agents to
learn new evidence, to forget old evidence, or to have a change of mind about the reli-
ability of existing evidence. This is clearly at odds with everyday experience where,
for example, agent i may believe ψ on the basis of an argument st only to find out
later that the evidence t on which st is crucially dependent is completely unreliable,
thereby forcing agent i to throw out both t and st and hence the belief in ψ on the basis
of st . What is missing from basic Justification Logics is a certain evidence dynamics,
whereby certain basic pieces of evidence can change their status from “good” to “bad”
(or the other way around).
A further criticism of the proof-based notion of evidence is that it neglects the
intuitive social role that evidence plays as a vehicle for persuasion: if agent i has an
argument supporting ϕ but agent j does not, then agent i ought to be able to tell agent
j of i’s argument supporting ϕ, which might have the effect of convincing agent j to
believe ϕ. Here what is missing is a means of describing how evidence dynamics can
be brought about as a result of communication. But note that the way in which this
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communication takes place must also be taken into account: i’s argument might be
told to j in public, which then might also effect the beliefs of other agents who hear
of i’s argument; alternatively, i’s argument may be told to j in private, which would
probably not effect the others’ beliefs (though they might develop suspicions as to
what i and j are talking about if they see i and j depart for a closed-door meeting).
One framework that elegantly describes a wide range of multi-agent communi-
cations—whether public or private, with or without deception, having or not having
suspicion, and so on—is the framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. In Dynamic
Epistemic Logic, a communication is modeled using what we call an update frame,
which is a finite Kripke frame4 whose worlds have been labeled by formulas. The
idea, developed by Baltag, Moss, and Solecki (BMS) (Baltag and Moss 2004; Baltag
et al. 1998) based on work on public announcements by Plaza (1989, 2007) and by
Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (Gerbrandy 1999; Gerbrandy and Groeneveld 1997), is
that each world w in an update frame represents a possible communication of the
formula χw that labels w. The structure of the arrows in the update frame describes
the agents’ conditional uncertainties as to which communication is actually taking
place: in case there is an i-arrow from world w to world w′, then agent i will think
it possible that the formula χw′ is communicated if it is the case that the formula χw
is actually communicated. This allows us to use update frames to represent a wide
variety of communications.
As an example, for a nonempty finite set A of agents, the update frame
represents the public announcement of ϕ. If χw = ϕ is actually communicated, then
each agent i ∈ A thinks that the only formula that can possibly be communicated is
the formula χw = ϕ itself.5 Thus to have such a communication occur is to make it the
case that every agent will simultaneously come to know ϕ, which is intuitively what
happens when a public announcement of ϕ occurs. Of course, the update frame above
for the public announcement of ϕ also says something about higher-order knowledge:
since there is a unique i-arrow from w to w for an agent i ∈ A and since there is also
a unique j-arrow from w to w for another agent j ∈ A , j knows that i knows that
ϕ is to be communicated. After all, at the unique world w that j considers possible,
agent i knows that χw is the formula that is communicated. It is not too hard to see
that the update frame above describes a situation in which it is common knowledge
that ϕ is communicated; that is, each agent knows that ϕ is communicated, each agent
knows that each agent knows that ϕ is communicated, each agent knows that each
agent knows that each agent knows that ϕ is communicated, and so on for any finite
4 A finite Kripke frame is a finite directed graph whose nodes are called “worlds” and whose edges are
labeled by agents’ names. We will call the edges of a finite Kripke frame “arrows” and we will use the
phrase “X -arrow” to refer to an arrow that is labeled by X .
5 We adopt the following drawing convention for update frames: for a (possibly empty) set S of agents, if
a drawing of an update frame contains an S-arrow from a world w to a world w′, then what is meant is that
for each agent a ∈ S, there is an a-arrow from w to w′.
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number of occurrences of the phrase “each agent knows that” appearing before the
phrase “ϕ is communicated.”
As another example, the update frame
represents the private announcement of ϕ to agent i , since in case χu = ϕ is the formula
that is actually communicated, the unique i-arrow from u to u says that i believes that
the only formula that can possibly be communicated is the formula χu = ϕ, whereas
the unique j-arrow from u to v for each j ∈ A −{i} says that any other agent j believes
that the formula χv =  (the propositional constant for truth, which conveys no new
information) was communicated.6 Thus if ϕ is actually communicated, then the infor-
mation about ϕ is sent to agent i while all the other agents gain no new information.
This is intuitively what it is to have a private announcement of ϕ to agent i .
Using symbols to denote update frames, Dynamic Epistemic Logic allows us to
form new formulas of the form [U, u]ϕ, where U is a symbol for an update frame, u is
a symbol naming a world in the update frame U (here u indicates that the formula χu
is what is actually communicated), and ϕ is a formula that has already been formed.
The formula [U, u]ϕ then says, “after the update (U, u), where the formula χu is
actually communicated, we have that ϕ is true.” (Note that we use the words “update”
and “communication” interchangeably because very complicated update frames are
better thought of as generalized “informational updates” due to the fact that there is
not always an intuitive, everyday communicative type corresponding to each complex
update frame; see the discussion in Renne (2006).) Since the formula ϕ occurring
in [U, u]ϕ can be a formula describing various agents’ beliefs, we see that Dynamic
Epistemic Logic can be used to describe how communications affect the beliefs of
agents; for example, [U, u]Biψ says that agent i believes ψ after the occurrence of
the update (U, u).
While a communication can affect agent belief, the language of Dynamic Epistemic
Logic—itself an extension of the language of modal logic—does not provide us with
the means to describe reasons for such changes in agent belief. To illustrate, let p be
a propositional letter and then consider a valid formula of the form p → [U, u]Bi p
(“if p is true, then, after update (U, u), agent i believes p”). This formula stipulates a
connection between the occurrence of the update (U, u) and agent i coming to believe
the atom p. In essence, the content of the update (U, u) brings about this change
in agent i’s belief, though the reason why this particular change in belief is brought
about is left unstated—the formula says only that this communication brings about
i’s change in belief for some reason. (This is similar to the case of modal logic itself,
6 More precisely: the A -arrow from v to v makes it so that in case χu = ϕ is the formula that is actually
communicated, each of the non-i agents mistakenly believes that it is common belief that  is communi-
cated (and so no new information is conveyed). So while i learns the new information ϕ—this due to the
i-arrow from u to u—the other agents have the mistaken common belief that no new information has been
communicated.
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where the formula Biϕ → Biψ does not say why it is that i’s belief in ψ follows
whenever he or she believes ϕ.) Indeed, despite the fact that an explanation based on
the structure of U justifies this change in i’s belief, this explanation is not expressible
within the language itself. So for example, if U is the public announcement of p, then
the explanation of why (U, u) causes i to believe p would go something like “since a
public announcement of a fact causes all agents to come to learn that fact, agent i will
come to believe the fact p after it is publicly announced”; however, such an explanation
cannot be formulated within the language. Furthermore, if we suppose that another
agent j believes that update (U, u) will cause agent i to come to believe the fact p,
B j (p → [U, u]Bi p),
then, just as in modal logic, there is no way for the language to describe agent j’s
justification for this belief. In short, the language is not only lacking the capacity to
express the agents’ reasons for holding their beliefs (as is the case with modal logic)
but it is also unable to express the agents’ reasons for changing their beliefs.
To summarize what we have said thus far, we have argued that each of Justification
Logic and Dynamic Epistemic Logic would be better suited for modeling, describing,
and studying rational agency if it had additional features. In the case of Justification
Logic, we have argued for the ability to handle evidence dynamics, taking into account
the social role that evidence plays as a vehicle for persuasion in various kinds of com-
munication, be it public or private, with or without deception, having or not having
suspicion, and so on. In the case of Dynamic Epistemic Logic, we have argued for an
in-language account of evidence so that agents can provide justifications not only as
to why they hold certain beliefs but also as to why they would change these beliefs.
We thus think it natural to look for a combined framework—something that might
eventually be called Dynamic Justification Logic—that brings together the comple-
mentary strengths from each of Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Justification Logic so
as to address each area’s respective weakness.
In this paper, we begin the project of Dynamic Justification Logic by propos-
ing a theory called JLCE that combines multi-agent communication and belief from
Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a new multi-agent Justification Logic for reasoning
about evidence and justification. JLCE, the theory of Justification Logic with Com-
munication and Elimination, allows us to reason not only about multi-agent belief
dynamics arising as the result of Dynamic Epistemic Logic-style communications—
hereafter called (multi-agent) communications—but also about a kind of multi-agent
evidence dynamics we call evidence elimination, whereby a piece of evidence t rel-
evant to a particular claim is to be set aside as part of a multi-agent communication
whose content effectively undermines the basic pieces of evidence that make up t . Our
email example indicates one of the many kinds of multi-agent evidence eliminations
that JLCE can reason about: with Bob’s basic piece of evidence x3 undermined, his
more complex evidence obtained by combining the rotten piece of evidence x3 with
another piece of evidence x1 is also undermined.
After defining the language, axiomatics, and semantics of JLCE, we will show how
this theory can be used to formalize the evidence elimination from our email example.
Along the way, we will prove a number of results about JLCE.
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3 Syntax
Our language, called UL (for “update language”), is used to reason about multi-agent
communication and evidence elimination for a finite nonempty set A of rational
agents. The atoms of UL are given as follows.
Definition 3.1 We define the sets
P := {pk | k ∈ N} of propositional letters,
C := {ck | k ∈ N} of constants, and
V := {xk | k ∈ N} of variables.
To define the full language of UL, we introduce the notion of update frame. Update
frames are an extension of the “action models” found in the Dynamic Epistemic Logic
literature (Baltag et al. 2008; Renne 2008b; van Ditmarsch et al. 2007).
Definition 3.2 Given a nonempty set F of formulas, to say that U is an F-update frame
means that U is a tuple (W U , RU , pU , vU ) whose components satisfy the following.
– W U is a nonempty finite set of worlds (in U ).
– RU : A → ℘(W U × W U ) assigns a transitive binary relation RUi to each agent
i ∈ A .7
– pU : W U → F labels worlds with formulas.
– vU : W U → ℘(V × A × F) labels worlds with finite sets of variable-agent-
formula triples (x, i, ϕ).8
An F-update frame U and a world u ∈ W U form a pointed F-update frame with
point u. For a set F ′ of formulas, we write U (F ′) to denote the set of pointed F ′-
update frames.
Pointed update frames are used to describe communications along with elimina-
tions of relevant evidence. Informally speaking, to say that t is relevant for agent i to
ϕ means that i considers evidence t to be probative for ϕ—that is, i believes that t
generally tends to demonstrate or prove ϕ—though i need not be persuaded to believe
ϕ on the basis of evidence t . So to have i take evidence t as relevant to ϕ is just to
say that i considers t to be admissible as evidence for ϕ, regardless of whether this
admissibility also comes with belief. We will write “t i ϕ” to mean that t is relevant
for i to ϕ. Note that agent i may consider many different pieces of evidence to be
relevant to a single assertion ϕ. The statement t i ϕ merely asserts that t is among
the possibly many pieces of evidence that are relevant to ϕ.
When agent i has a piece of evidence t relevant to ϕ and agent i also believes that
ϕ is true, then we will say that t is agent i’s evidence for believing ϕ and we will write
7 Our reasons for taking RUi transitive are for convenience only. We shall discuss this point later in
Remark 3.13.
8 Finiteness ensures that update frames can in principle be written out (using an appropriate syntac-
tic encoding) and that a forthcoming theory based on update frames (the U -calculus, Definition 3.5) is
decidable.
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“t :i ϕ”. So we have two notions of evidence: the weaker notion t i ϕ of relevant
evidence and the stronger notion t :i ϕ of relevant evidence plus belief.
Pointed update frames (U, u) will be used to describe an update, which is a multi-
agent communication. A pointed update frame (U, u) describes the communication
of the formula pU (u) within a collection {pU (v) | v ∈ W U } of formulas that might be
communicated. So while the update (U, u) actually communicates the formula pU (u),
the agents have uncertainty as to which communication actually occurs according to the
structure of the Kripke frame (W U , RU ) underlying U and the way in which pU labels
worlds in U by formulas. We explained this in greater detail above in the introduction,
where we gave examples of two update frames, one for the public announcement of
ϕ and one for the private announcement of ϕ to agent i .
Our contribution in this paper is to add a notion of multi-agent evidence elimination
to the above-described BMS-picture. We thus view each world in an update frame U
as constituting a possible communication and elimination: for an update (U, u), a
variable x ∈ V , an agent i ∈ A , and an assertion ϕ, if (x, i, ϕ) ∈ vU (u), then the
communication and elimination possibility u simultaneously communicates pU (u)
and eliminates agent i’s evidence x relevant to ϕ, which has the effect of falsifying
x i ϕ. But an elimination of a variable x relevant to an assertion can have conse-
quences for other pieces of evidence sx that are built up from x . We saw this in our
email example: Anne’s final email x5 eliminated Bob’s basic piece of evidence x3
relevant to the store being open, and this elimination itself triggered an elimination of
Bob’s combined evidence x1 and x3 that Anne is bringing the cheese.
Definition 3.3 G0 is the following grammar.
t ::= c | x | t ·ϕ t | t + t | !t
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ϕ → ϕ | Biϕ | t i ϕ
c ∈ C , x ∈ V , p ∈ P, i ∈ A
Let T0 be the set of expressions built using t as a start symbol in grammar G0, and
let F0 be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G0. Then,
whenever the pair (Tk,Fk) is defined, we define grammar Gk+1 as follows.
t ::= s | t ·ϕ t | t + t | !t
ϕ ::= ψ | ϕ → ϕ | Biϕ | t i ϕ | [U, u]ϕ
s ∈ Tk, ψ ∈ Fk, i ∈ A , (U, u) ∈ U (Fk)
Let Tk+1 be the set of expressions built using t as a start symbol in grammar Gk+1,
and let Fk+1 be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar
Gk+1. Finally, we define the set T := ⋃k∈N Tk of UL-terms (also called terms) and
the set F := ⋃k∈N Fk of UL-formulas (also called formulas). We adopt the usual
abbreviations for other logical connectives. The update language, written UL, is the
pair (T ,F ) consisting of the set T of terms and the set F of formulas. We define the
set U := U (F ) of pointed UL-update frames (also called pointed update frames).
Definition 3.4 t :i ϕ abbreviates (t i ϕ) ∧ Biϕ.
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The constants and variables together constitute the atomic terms. The symbol Bi
is called an i -belief modal (or simply a belief modal), the symbol i is called an
i -arrow (or simply an arrow), the symbol :i is called an i -colon (or simply a colon),
and the symbol [U, u] is called an update modal. There are a number of interesting
sub-languages of UL; in particular, the basic fragment is the pair (Tb,Fb) obtained
from (T0,F0) by restricting formulas containing belief modals or arrows to the form
t :i ϕ. We assign the following informal readings to the key formulas in UL.
– Biϕ is read, “agent i believes ϕ.”
– t i ϕ is read, “t is agent i’s evidence relevant to ϕ.”
– t :i ϕ is read, “t is agent i’s evidence for believing ϕ.”
– [U, u]ϕ is read, “after update (U, u), formula ϕ is true.”
Each term describes a way of obtaining derived evidence from given evidence
through the use of logical principles; let us discuss this now. The constants c ∈ C play
a special role as evidence relevant to the axioms of our theory, and the variables x ∈ V
are used as contingent relevant evidence that may be directly affected by an evidence
elimination. The operation ·ϕ takes evidence t relevant to an implication ϕ → ψ and
evidence s relevant to the antecedent ϕ and produces the evidence t ·ϕ s relevant to the
consequent ψ , in accord with the rule of Modus Ponens. The operation + is the union
of pieces of relevant evidence: t + s is relevant evidence for anything for which one or
both of t and s is relevant evidence. The operation ! (“bang”) is an evidence checker:
in case t is relevant evidence for ϕ, then !t (“bang t”) checks that t is evidence for ϕ.
Definition 3.5 Given an update frame U , the U-calculus is defined in Fig. 1.
The U -calculus will be used to describe the effect evidence eliminations have on
evidence relevance in the following way: the update (U, u) eliminates agent i’s evi-
dence t relevant to ϕ—meaning that t i ϕ will be false after update (U, u)—if and
only if U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ) is derivable in the U -calculus.
Remark 3.6 (Variable-Driven Elimination) We observe that our formulation of the
U -calculus in Fig. 1 restricts evidence elimination in such a way that whenever update
(U, u) eliminates agent i’s evidence t relevant to ϕ—thereby falsifying t i ϕ—this
Fig. 1 The U -calculus
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elimination can be traced back to an elimination of one or more variables x ∈ V as rel-
evant evidence for agent i . This restriction, which we call variable-driven elimination,
guarantees that whenever a formula of the form s i ψ is derivable in our forthcom-
ing theory JLCE (Definition 3.12), it will not be possible for an update (U ′, u′) to
eliminate s as agent i’s evidence relevant to ψ . Variable-driven elimination therefore
maintains a property of elimination consistency: to say that s i ψ is derivable in our
forthcoming theory JLCE means that s is always agent i’s evidence relevant to ψ , and
hence no elimination can eliminate s as agent i’s evidence relevant to ψ . While the
author conjectures that it is possible to develop an alternative to the U -calculus that
provides for elimination consistency under a condition weaker than that of variable-
driven elimination, allowing eliminations to be traced back to a term t ∈ T that need
not be a variable, various syntactic consistency checks would need to be imposed
on the structure of update-frame–eliminable terms in order to maintain elimination
consistency. In the interest of simplicity in a first paper on evidence elimination in
Justification Logic, the author has gone the route of variable-driven elimination. This
may seem problematic: in everyday life, one often discovers a problem with his or her
reasoning only after it has gone on for some time and then suddenly faces a contra-
diction. This suggests that one should eliminate the more complex piece of evidence
s directly and then see what consequences this has not only for the various pieces
of complex evidence that make use of s but also those pieces of simpler evidence
that themselves make up s. Put another way, what is suggested is a general theory of
evidence-based Belief Revision, in which an agent reasons in a step-by-step manner
according to his or her evidence, adjusting this evidence on-the-fly whenever con-
tradictions are encountered or new information comes in. While this is an extremely
interesting and promising line of work, the scope of this study is too large for the
purposes of a single paper.
The goal of this paper is to provide a basic account of the way in which complex
pieces of evidence are affected by changes in basic pieces of evidence. So evidence
elimination is not at all a general account of evidence-based Belief Revision but instead
an account of part of an adversarial argumentative process that plays an important role
in the overall evidence-based Belief Revision picture. In particular, this process is one
in which an agent’s reasoning is successfully undermined by an attack on the premises
underlying that reasoning. To illustrate, think of the friends in our email example as
employees of a catering company managed by Bob and assume that an angry client
Daisy sues Bob in court, alleging that the employees of the company ruined her party
by providing crackers without any cheese, and this was due to the manager Bob’s
negligence. Bob might show emails x1 through x4 to the court to argue that he was
not negligent. But when Daisy manages to obtain a copy of email x5 and shows this
to the court, thereby eliminating Bob’s evidence that he did not know of any problem
his employees might have in delivering both the crackers and the cheese, the court
will presumably side with Daisy. So we see how evidence elimination is about this
fundamental adversarial process of undermining an agent’s reasoning by attacking the
premises. But while this process is very important to a general theory of evidence-
based Belief Revision, it is merely one way in which evidence changes in light of
new information within a generalized framework of evidence-based Belief Revision.
Other changes that directly affect more complex pieces of evidence need to be studied
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as well, and future work in Dynamic Justification Logic will aim toward establishing
a general account of evidence-based Belief Revision that does just this. In the mean-
time, the work in the present paper shall stick to the study of variable-based evidence
elimination.
Given (U, u) and (t, i, ϕ), either U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ) or U, u  (t, i, ϕ), and determin-
ing which of these is the case is a decidable question. Further, the U -calculus satisfies
the following anti-monotonicity property.
Lemma 3.7 (Anti-Monotonicity) U, u′ 	 (t, i, ψ) and u RUi u′ together imply that
U, u 	 (t, i, ψ).
Proof By a straightforward induction on the length of the derivation of U, u′ 	
(t, i, ψ). 
unionsq
To state the axiomatics, we define a notion of composition for update frames that
allows us to take pointed update frames (U, u) and (U ′, u′) and build a pointed update
frame
(
U ◦ U ′, (u, u′)) whose execution has the same effect as the sequential execu-
tion of update (U, u) followed by update (U ′, u′).
Notation 3.8 (Functions on Pairs) We shall often write “ f (a, b)” instead of
“ f ((a, b))” when we wish to denote the value of function f on the pair (a, b); our
intended meaning will be clear from context.
Definition 3.9 To define the composition U ◦ U ′, we use standard definitions from
Dynamic Epistemic Logic Baltag et al. (2008); Renne (2008b); van Ditmarsch
et al. (2007) for the first three components: set W U◦U ′ := W U × W U ′ , allow
(u, u′)RU◦U ′i (v, v′) if and only if u R
U




, and set pU◦U ′(u, u′) :=¬[U, u]




Theorem 3.10 (Composition Correctness) If U and U ′ are update frames, then so is
U ◦ U ′.
Proof It suffices to verify that RU◦U ′i is transitive for each i ∈ A , but this follows by




i is transitive. 
unionsq
The definition of composition ensures that
(
U ◦ U ′, (u, u′)) eliminates agent i’s
evidence t relevant to the assertion that ϕ if and only if at least one of (U, u) or (U ′, u′)
eliminates i’s evidence t relevant to the assertion that ϕ.
Lemma 3.11 (Composition) Given update frames U and U ′, the following statements
are equivalent.
– U ◦ U ′, (u, u′) 	 (t, i, ϕ).
– U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ) or U ′, u′ 	 (t, i, ϕ).
Proof By induction on the construction of t . The base case t ∈ C follows immedi-
ately and the base case t ∈ V follows because vU◦U ′(u, u′) = vU (u) ∪ vU ′(u′). The
induction cases t = s1 ·ϕ s2, t = s1 +s2, and t = !s follow by the induction hypothesis
and respective use of rules EAL and EAR, ES, and EC (Fig. 1). 
unionsq
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Finally, we state in two parts the axioms and rules of our theory of Justification Logic
with Communication and Elimination, written JLCE. The first part is the axiomatic
theory AX (Fig. 2), and the second part is our theory JLCE itself (Fig. 3).
Definition 3.12 The theory AX is defined in Fig. 2. Regarding Axiom U3, we stipu-
late that a conjunction ∧u RUi v χv ranging over the set S := {v ∈ W U | u RUi v} is to be
identified with a fixed tautology denoted by “” whenever S = ∅. The theory JLCE
is defined in Fig. 3. The theory JLCE∗ consists of Rules AX and MP from Fig. 3.
We will see later that the theories JLCE and JLCE∗ derive the same theorems.
This result will be useful: while our primary interest is in the full theory JLCE, it is
sometimes easier to prove a given result using the simpler theory JLCE∗.
Fig. 2 The theory AX
Fig. 3 The theory JLCE
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Remark 3.13 We observe two points. First, in the statement of Axiom U4 (Fig. 2),
we have offloaded to the U -calculus the work of determining the particular form the
axiom should take for a given triple (t, i, ϕ). It is possible to eliminate this reliance on
an external theory by including new formulas in the language that allow us to embed
the U-calculus into the overall theory. See Renne (2011) for details on how this is
done in a theory of simple evidence elimination for Justification Logic. The reason
we have offloaded the work in this way in this paper is to save space and to simplify
the presentation of the axiomatics.
Second, we have assumed that agent belief is governed by the modal theory K4 and
hence that agent belief is introspective (meaning it satisfies Axiom B2, which says that
if agent i believes something, then she believes she believes it). While other choices are
possible in Justification Logic Kuznets (2008); Renne (2008a), they would introduce
complications here that would distract us from the focus of this paper: multi-agent
communication and evidence elimination.
Notation 3.14 (Provable Equivalence ϕ ⇔ ϕ′ and ϕ ⇔∗ ϕ′) We write ϕ ⇔ ϕ′ to
mean that 	 ϕ ⇔ ϕ′, and we write ϕ ⇔∗ ϕ′ to mean that 	∗ ϕ ⇔ ϕ′. Given n ∈ N,
we write
ϕ0 ⇔ ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2 ⇔ · · · ⇔ ϕn (1)
to mean that we have ϕi ⇔ ϕi+1 for each i ∈ N with i < n. Similarly, given n ∈ N,
we write (1) with each “⇔” replaced by “⇔∗” to mean that we have ϕi ⇔∗ ϕi+1 for
each i ∈ N with i < n.
4 The internalization theorem
Artemov (2001) first identified a key result of single-agent Justification Logics (where
|A | = 1) called the property of internalization: if A = {a}, then for each theorem
ϕ, there is a term t such that t :a ϕ is also a theorem. Internalization specifies the
way in which a Justification Logic allows us to describe proofs of the theory using
terms, which bolsters our reading of terms as pieces of evidence for the formulas that
they label. In this section, we will prove the internalization property for JLCE. To
do this, we will show first that JLCE∗ has internalization (this is the forthcoming
Lemma 4.2) and then prove that JLCE∗ and JLCE derive the same theorems (this
is the forthcoming Theorem 4.13). The proofs of these results require quite a bit of
work, so we shall proceed incrementally. We begin with a lemma that shows that in
JLCE∗, evidence—and not just relevant evidence—is closed under the term-forming
operations ·ϕ and +.
Lemma 4.1 We have each of the following.
1. 	∗ t :i (ϕ → ψ) →
(
(s :i ϕ) → (t ·ϕ s) :i ψ
)
.
2. 	∗ ((t :i ϕ) ∨ (s :i ϕ)) → (t + s) :i ϕ.
Proof Using PR to denote use of classical propositional reasoning, the proofs appear
in Figs. 4 and 5. 
unionsq
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Fig. 4 Proof that 	∗ t :i (ϕ → ψ) →
(
(s :i ϕ) → (t ·ϕ s) :i ψ
)
Fig. 5 Proof that 	∗ ((t :i ϕ) ∨ (s :i ϕ)) → (t + s) :i ϕ
Lemma 4.2 (JLCE∗ Internalization; (Artemov 2001; Renne 2008a)) If 	∗ ϕ and
i ∈ A , then there there is a term t ∈ T such that 	∗ t :i ϕ.
Proof This argument is a straightforward adaptation of the standard proof of Arte-
mov’s original internalization result Artemov (2001). Choosing i ∈ A , the proof is
by induction on the length of JLCE∗ derivations. If the last step of the proof was Rule
AX, then set t := c0 and observe that 	∗ c0 :i ϕ by Rule AX. If the last step of the
proof was Rule MP from premises ψ → ϕ and ψ , then it follows by the induction
hypothesis that there is a term s1 ∈ T and a term s2 ∈ T such that 	∗ s1 :i (ψ → ϕ)
and 	∗ s2 :i ψ . So set t := s1 ·ψ s2 and observe that 	∗ (s1 ·ψ s2) :i ϕ by Lemma 4.1
and classical propositional reasoning. 
unionsq
While JLCE∗ does not explicitly include Rule BN, the following lemma shows
that this rule is admissible. Since JLCE is just JLCE∗ plus the rules BN and UN, this
lemma gets us one step closer to showing that the theories JLCE∗ and JLCE derive
the same theorems.
Lemma 4.3 (Belief Admissibility) If 	∗ ϕ and i ∈ A , then 	∗ Biϕ.
Proof Suppose 	∗ ϕ and i ∈ A . Then for some term t ∈ T , we have 	∗ t :i ϕ by
Lemma 4.2. Since t :i ϕ abbreviates (t i ϕ) ∧ Biϕ, it follows by classical proposi-
tional reasoning that 	∗ Biϕ. 
unionsq
Once we know that Rule BN is admissible, we can show that evidence (and not just
relevant evidence) is closed under the term-forming operation !.
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Fig. 6 Proof that 	∗ t :i ϕ → !t :i (t :i ϕ)
Lemma 4.4 We have 	∗ t :i ϕ → !t :i (t :i ϕ).
Proof Using PR to denote the use of classical propositional reasoning and MR to
denote the use of modal reasoning (using Lemma 4.3 in place of Rule BN), the proof
appears in Fig. 6. 
unionsq
Since Rule BN is admissible in JLCE∗, to show that the theories JLCE∗ and JLCE
derive the same theorems, it suffices for us to show that Rule UN is also admissible
in JLCE∗. Before we begin the proof of this result, we need the following auxiliary
lemmas. The first concerns preconditions of a composition and the second concerns
associativity of composition.
Lemma 4.5 pU◦U ′(u, u′) ⇔∗ [U, u]pU ′(u′) ∧ pU (u).
Proof Using PR to denote use of classical propositional reasoning:
pU◦U ′(u, u′)
⇔∗ ¬[U, u]¬pU ′(u′) CL, Def. 3.9
⇔∗ ¬([U, u]pU ′(u′) → [U, u]⊥) U2, PR
⇔∗ ¬([U, u]pU ′(u′) → (pU (u) → ⊥)) U1, PR
⇔∗ [U, u]pU ′(u′) ∧ pU (u) PR

unionsq
Lemma 4.6 [(U¯ ◦ U ) ◦ U ′, ((u¯, u), u′)]ϕ ⇔∗ [U¯ ◦ (U ◦ U ′), (u¯, (u, u′))]ϕ.
Proof By induction on the construction of ϕ.9 In what follows, update frames will
be named using the symbol U perhaps with additional marks such as primes or bars.
9 Note that this is actually an induction on k ∈ N with a sub-induction on the construction of ϕ ∈ Fk .
However, since the sub-inductive arguments are essentially independent of k, we shall only present the
sub-inductive arguments themselves. It will be apparent from context whether an appeal to the “induction
hypothesis” concerns the “inner” sub-induction hypothesis (the statement that the result holds for certain
formulas in Fk that have already been constructed) or the “outer” induction hypothesis (the statement that
the result holds for formulas in
⋃k−1
i=0 Fi , all of which have already been constructed).
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Fig. 7 Proof that p(U¯◦U )◦U ′ ⇔∗ pU¯◦(U◦U ′), proof of Lemma 4.6
Fig. 8 Proof of induction case Bi ψ , proof of Lemma 4.6
Worlds in update frames will be named using the symbol u with corresponding marks.
This allows us to write [U ′] to denote the update modal [U ′, u′], to write pU¯ to denote
the formula pU¯ (u¯), to write U  (t, i, ψ) to denote the expression U, u  (t, i, ψ),
to write [U ◦ U ′] to denote the update modal [U ◦ U ′, (u, u′)], and so on. Proceeding
with the proof, many cases require us to prove that
p(U¯◦U )◦U ′ ⇔∗ pU¯◦(U◦U ′). (2)
Using PR to denote the use of classical propositional reasoning, we provide the text
of the proof for this assertion in Fig. 7 with the understanding that a copy of this text
is to be construed as occurring at the beginning of the proofs of those cases where the
result (2) is needed. We now provide the proofs of the each case. In what follows, we
use IH to denote the use of the induction hypothesis.
– Base (or induction) case q ∈ P ∪ {⊥} is proved using U1, (2) and PR, and U1.
– Induction case ψ → χ with is proved using U2, IH and PR, and U2.
– Induction case Biψ is proved in Fig. 8; MR denotes the use of modal reasoning
(with Lemma 4.3 used in place of Rule BN).
– For induction case t i ψ , it follows by Lemma 3.11 that we have the “left” state-
ment (U¯ ◦ U ) ◦ U ′ 	 (t, i, ψ) if and only if U¯ 	 (t, i, ψ) or U 	 (t, i, ψ) or
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Fig. 9 Proof of induction case [Uˆ ]q, proof of Lemma 4.6
U ′ 	 (t, i, ψ). But the latter disjunctive trio is equivalent by Lemma 3.11 to the
“right” statement U¯ ◦ (U ◦ U ′) 	 (t, i, ψ). The result is proved using U4 (with
the left statement), (2) and PR, and U4 (with the right statement).
– Induction case [Uˆ ]q with q ∈ P ∪ {⊥} is proved in Fig. 9.
– Induction case [Uˆ ](ψ → χ) is proved using U5, U2, U5 and PR, IH and PR, U5
and PR, U2, and U5.
– Induction case [Uˆ ]Biψ is proved in Fig. 10.
– For induction case [Uˆ ](t i ψ), we observe that, similar to induction case t i ψ
above, we have ((U¯ ◦U ) ◦U ′) ◦ Uˆ 	 (t, i, ψ) if and only if (U¯ ◦ (U ◦U ′)) ◦ Uˆ 	
(t, i, ψ) by Lemma 3.11. We make use of this biconditional in our proof in Fig. 11
(by assuming that U4 can be used in the second provable equivalence if and only
if U4 can be used in the second-to-last provable equivalence).
– Induction case [U1][U2]ψ is proved in Fig. 12. 
unionsq
In one part of our proof that Rule UN is JLCE∗-admissible, we will show that Rule
UN is AX-admissible. A key case of this proof requires an important lemma about
“preconditions” (the forthcoming Lemma 4.7) along with an interesting lemma about
substitution (the forthcoming Lemma 4.10).
Lemma 4.7 (Precondition) For each ϕ ∈F , we have [U, u]ϕ ⇔∗ pU (u) → [U, u]ϕ.
Proof By induction on the construction of ϕ, with PR denoting use of classical prop-
ositional reasoning and IH denoting the use of the induction hypothesis.
– Base case q ∈ P ∪ {⊥}. See Fig. 13.
– Induction case ψ → χ . See Fig. 14.
– Induction case Biψ . See Fig. 15.
– Induction case t i ψ is similar to case Biψ , though U4 is used in place of U3.
Note that each time U4 is used, the particular form that U4 takes depends on the
truth of the single assertion U, u 	 (t, i, ψ).
– Induction case [U ′, u′]ψ . See Fig. 16. 
unionsq
Definition 4.8 (L(ϕ), S(ϕ), Substitutions ψσ and ψσU,u) Let ϕ ∈ F . L(ϕ) is the
set of propositional letters occurring in ϕ (note that a propositional letter pk occurring
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Fig. 10 Proof of induction case [Uˆ ]Bi ψ , proof of Lemma 4.6
Fig. 11 Proof of induction case [Uˆ ]t i ψ , proof of Lemma 4.6
in ϕ may occur within an update modal [U, u] that itself occurs in ϕ). S(ϕ) is the set
of functions σ : L(ϕ) → F that map the natural-number subscript k of propositional
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Fig. 12 Proof of induction case [U1][U2]ψ , proof of Lemma 4.6
Fig. 13 Base case q ∈ P ∪ {⊥}, Lemma 4.7
Fig. 14 Induction case ψ → χ , Lemma 4.7
Fig. 15 Induction case Bi ψ , Lemma 4.7
letter pk occurring in ϕ to formula σ(k) ∈ F . To define substitution of formulas for
propositional letters: given σ ∈ S(ϕ) and ψ ∈ F , we let ψσ denote the formula
obtained from ψ by simultaneously replacing for each k ∈ L(ϕ) all occurrences of
the propositional letter pk in ψ by the formula σ(k). Note that for pk to be replaced
in ψ by a substitution σ ∈ S(ϕ), the propositional letter pk must occur both in ψ
Fig. 16 Induction case [U ′, u′]ψ , Lemma 4.7
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Fig. 17 Induction case ψ1 → ψ2, Lemma 4.10
and in ϕ. Given (U, u) ∈ U , ϕ ∈ F , and σ ∈ S(ϕ), we define the substitution
σU,u : L(ϕ) → F by setting σU,u(k) := [U, u]σ(k) for each k ∈ L(ϕ).
Definition 4.9 (Propositional Logic PL) PL is the set of formulas in the language of
propositional logic having atoms q ∈ P ∪ {⊥} and the binary Boolean connective →
for implication. Use of logical connectives not in this language is to be understood as
an abbreviation of the expression that uses connectives that do appear in this language.
We observe that PL is a sublanguage of UL.
Lemma 4.10 (Substitution) For each ψ ∈ PL, each σ ∈ S(ψ), and each (U, u) ∈ U ,
we have [U, u](ψσ) ⇔∗ pU (u) → (ψσU,u).
Proof By induction on the construction of ψ ∈ PL, with IH denoting use of the
induction hypothesis and PR denoting use of classical propositional reasoning.
– Base case: ψ = p ∈ P . We have [U, u](pσ) ⇔∗ pU (u) → [U, u](pσ) by
Lemma 4.7, and we have [U, u](pσ) = pσU,u by the definition of σU,u .
– Base case: ψ = ⊥. We have ⊥σ = ⊥ by the definition of substitution, and we
have [U, u]⊥ ⇔∗ pU (u) → ⊥ by Axiom U1.
– Induction case: ψ = ψ1 → ψ2. See Fig. 17. 
unionsq
We are now ready to prove the JLCE∗-admissibility of Rule UN. We begin by
showing that this rule is AX-admissible.
Lemma 4.11 (AX Update Admissibility) AX 	 ϕ implies 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ϕ.
Proof By induction on the length of AX derivations, using PR to denote the use of
classical propositional reasoning and MR to denote the use of modal reasoning (using
Lemma 4.3 in place of rule BN).
– Base case: Axiom CL. Given an instance ϕ ∈F of CL, there exists a classical prop-
ositional tautologyψ ∈ PL and a substitutionσ ∈ S(ψ) such thatϕ = ψσ . Choose
an arbitrary (U¯ , u¯) ∈ U . Since ψ is a tautology, it follows that 	∗ ψσ U¯ ,u¯ by
Axiom CL and hence that 	∗ pU¯ (u¯) → (ψσ U¯ ,u¯) by PR. Applying Lemma 4.10,
it follows that 	∗ [U¯ , u¯](ψσ). Since ϕ = ψσ , we have shown that 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ϕ,
as desired.
– Base case: Axiom B1. See Fig. 18.
– Base case: Axiom B2. See Fig. 19.
– Base case: Axiom E1. For each t ∈ T , i ∈ A , ψ ∈ F , and (U, u) ∈ U , define
the formula (t, i, ψ)U,u by setting
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Fig. 18 Base case B1, proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 19 Base case B2, proof of Lemma 4.11
(t, i, ψ)U,u :=
{¬pU (u) if U, u 	 (t, i, ψ),
pU (u) → t i ψ if U, u  (t, i, ψ).
We let (t, i, ψ)U,u1 mean that (t, i, ψ)U,u = ¬pU (u), and (t, i, ψ)U,u0 denote the
negation of (t, i, ψ)U,u1 . By inspection of the U¯ -calculus (Fig. 1), it is clear that
we have
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(
(t, i, ϕ → ψ)U¯ ,u¯1 or (s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1
)
iff (t ·ϕ s, i, ψ)U¯ ,u¯1 . (3)
Further, we have the following chain of provable equivalences.
[U¯ , u¯](t i (ϕ→ψ)→(s i ϕ → t ·ϕ s i ψ))
⇔∗ [U¯ , u¯](t i (ϕ→ψ))→([U¯ , u¯](s i ϕ)→[U¯ , u¯](t ·ϕ s i ψ)) U2, PR
⇔∗ (t, i, ϕ→ψ)U¯ ,u¯ →((s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ →(t ·ϕ s, i, ψ)U¯ ,u¯) U4, PR
If (t ·ϕ s, i, ψ)U¯ ,u¯1 , then it follows by (3) that (t, i, ϕ → ψ)U¯ ,u¯1 or (s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1
and hence that the last formula in the above chain of provable equivalences is an
instance of Axiom CL. If (t ·ϕ s, i, ψ)U¯ ,u¯0 , then it follows by (3) that (t, i, ϕ →
ψ)
U¯ ,u¯
0 and (s, i, ϕ)
U¯ ,u¯
0 ; the last formula in the above chain is therefore JLCE∗-
provably equivalent (by PR) to
pU¯ (u¯) → (t i (ϕ → ψ) → ((s i ϕ) → (t ·ϕ s i ψ))),
which is itself JLCE∗-provable by PR from Axiom E1.
– Base case: Axiom E2. By inspection of the U -calculus (Fig. 1), it is clear that we
have
(




iff (t + s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1 . (4)
Further, we have the following chain of provable equivalences.
[U¯ , u¯](t i ϕ → t + s i ϕ)
⇔∗ [U¯ , u¯](t i ϕ) → [U¯ , u¯](t + s i ϕ) U2
⇔∗ (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ → (t + s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ U4, PR
If (t + s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1 , then it follows by (4) that (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1 and hence that the last
formula in the above chain of provable equivalences is an instance of Axiom CL.
If (t + s, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯0 , then it follows by (4) that (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯0 and hence that the last
formula in the above chain is JLCE∗-provably equivalent to
pU¯ (u¯) → ((t i ϕ) → (t + s i ϕ)),
which is itself JLCE∗-provable by PR from Axiom E2. The argument for the other
form of Axiom E2, (s i ϕ) → (t + s i ϕ), is similar.
– Base case: Axiom E3. The argument is similar to the argument for Axiom E2,
though Axiom E3 is used at the end in place of Axiom E2.
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Fig. 20 Base case U1, proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 21 Base case U2, proof of Lemma 4.11
– Base case: Axiom E4. Consider the following chain of provable equivalences.
[U¯ , u¯](t i ϕ → Bi (t i ϕ))
⇔∗ [U¯ , u¯](t i ϕ) → [U¯ , u¯]Bi (t i ϕ) U2
⇔∗ (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ → [U¯ , u¯]Bi (t i ϕ) U4, PR
⇔∗ (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ → (pU¯ (u¯) → ∧
u¯ RU¯i v¯
Bi [U¯ , v¯](t i ϕ)) U3, PR
⇔∗ (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯ → (pU¯ (u¯) → ∧
u¯ RU¯i v¯
Bi (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,v¯) U4, MR
If (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯1 , then the last line of the above chain of provable equivalences is an
instance of Axiom CL. So let us assume that (t, i, ϕ)U¯ ,u¯0 and hence that (t, i, ϕ)
U¯ ,u¯
0
by Lemma 3.7. The following is then a JLCE∗-derivation of the last line of the
above chain.
1. (t i ϕ) → Bi (t i ϕ) E4
2. (t i ϕ) → ∧u¯ RU¯i v¯ Bi (pU¯ (v¯) → t i ϕ) MR 1
3. (pU¯ (u¯) → t i ϕ) →
(pU¯ (u¯) → ∧
u¯ RU¯i v¯
Bi (pU¯ (v¯) → t i ϕ)) PR 2
– Base case: Axiom U1. By Fig. 20, Axiom U2, and PR.
– Base case: Axiom U2. By Fig. 21, Axiom U2, and PR.
– Base case: Axiom U3. By Fig. 22, Axiom U2, and PR.
– Base case: Axiom U4. We consider three sub-cases.
1. First sub-case: U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ). Axiom U4 then has the form [U, u](t i ϕ) ↔
¬pU (u). The result follows by Fig. 23, Axiom U2, and PR.
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Fig. 22 Base case U3, proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 23 Base case U4 (first sub-case), proof of Lemma 4.11
2. Second sub-case: U, u  (t, i, ϕ) and U¯ , u¯  (t, i, ϕ). Axiom U4 then has the
form [U, u](t i ϕ) ↔ (pU (u) → t i ϕ). The result follows by Fig. 24,
Axiom U2, and PR.
3. Third sub-case: U, u  (t, i, ϕ) and U¯ , u¯ 	 (t, i, ϕ). Axiom U4 then has the
form [U, u](t i ϕ) ↔ (pU (u) → t i ϕ). The result follows by Fig. 25,
Axiom U2, and PR.
– Base case: Axiom U5. By Fig. 26, Axiom U2, and PR.
– Induction case: Rule CN. Suppose ck :i ϕ was derived by Rule CN from
AX-theorem ϕ. Applying the definition of ck :i ϕ, it follows that 	∗ ϕ,	∗ ck i ϕ,
and 	∗ Biϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we have 	∗ [U¯ , v¯]ϕ for arbitrary
v¯ ∈ W U¯ and hence that 	∗ ∧
u¯ RU¯i v¯
Bi [U¯ , v¯]ϕ by MR. But then it follows by
PR that the first line of the chain of equivalences in Fig. 27 is JLCE∗-derivable.
The result follows by PR. 
unionsq
Lemma 4.12 (Update Admissibility) 	∗ ϕ implies 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ϕ.
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Fig. 24 Base case U4 (second sub-case), proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 25 Base case U4 (third sub-case), proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 26 Base case U5, proof of Lemma 4.11
Fig. 27 Induction case CN, proof of Lemma 4.11
Proof By induction on the length of JLCE∗ derivations. In the base and induction
cases where Rule AX was used, the result follows by Lemma 4.11. In the induction
case where Rule MP was used with premises ϕ → ψ and ϕ, it follows by the induc-
tion hypothesis that 	∗ [U¯ , u¯](ϕ → ψ) and 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ϕ. Applying Axiom U2 and
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classical propositional reasoning, it follows that 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ϕ → [U¯ , u¯]ψ . Therefore,
by Rule MP, we conclude that 	∗ [U¯ , u¯]ψ . 
unionsq
Theorem 4.13 (Admissibility) 	 ϕ if and only if 	∗ ϕ.
Proof The left-to-right direction is shown by induction on the length of JLCE deri-
vation and makes use of Belief Admissibility and Update Admissibility (Lemmas 4.3
and 4.12). The right-to-left direction is immediate: a JLCE∗ derivation is a JLCE
derivation. 
unionsq
Theorem 4.14 (JLCE Internalization) If 	 ϕ and i ∈ A , then there is a term t ∈ T
such that 	 t :i ϕ.
Proof By JLCE∗ Internalization (Lemma 4.2) and Theorem 4.13. 
unionsq
5 Depth and reduction
One of the central results of many Dynamic Epistemic Logics is the Reduction The-
orem, which says that every formula ϕ containing an update modal [U, u] can be
“reduced” to a provably equivalent formula ϕ† that does not contain any update mo-
dals. The Reduction Theorem typically plays an important role in the proof of com-
pleteness, and this is so for the theories JLCE and JLCE∗ as well. However, in these
theories, Reduction has the following variant form: each formula ϕ can be “reduced”
to a provably equivalent formula ϕ† whose update modals occur only within the scope
of a term, by which we mean that update modals appear only in subformulas ψ that
themselves occur within a subformula having the form t i ψ . As we will see later,
this version of Reduction is sufficient for proving completeness for JLCE and JLCE∗.
Since we saw in Theorem 4.13 that JLCE and JLCE∗ derive the same theorems,
it suffices for us to prove Reduction for JLCE∗. As in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
van Ditmarsch et al. (2007), we proceed by defining a notion of “depth” for the lan-
guage; this notion is sometimes called “complexity” by other authors.
Fig. 28 Definition of a function d : F ∪ T → N. Note this definition is adapted from van Ditmarsch
et al. 2007
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Fig. 29 Definition of a function † : F → F , Theorem 5.2
Definition 5.1 (Depth) The equations in Fig. 28 define a function d : F ∪ T → N
that maps each o ∈ F ∪ T to a natural number d(o) called the depth of o. For each
n ∈ N+, we define the sets
F (n) := {ϕ ∈ F | d(ϕ) ≤ n}
T (n) := {t ∈ T | t occurs in some ϕ ∈ F (n)}
U (n) := U (T (n),F (n))
and define the language UL(n) := (T (n),F (n)).
With the definition of depth in hand, we now define how to “reduce” a given formula
to a JLCE∗-equivalent formula whose update modals occur only within the scope of
a term.
Theorem 5.2 (Reduction) The schematic equations in Fig. 29 define a function † :
F → F that maps each formula ϕ to a formula ϕ† such that ϕ ⇔∗ ϕ†. Further,
the schematic equations in Fig. 29 are depth-respecting: for each F -instance of a
schematic equation in Fig. 29, the function † is applied on the left-hand side to a
formula whose depth is strictly greater than that of any formula on the right-hand side
to which † is applied.
Proof To show that equations in Fig. 29 define a function that takes each formula
ϕ to a formula ϕ†, we argue by induction on n ∈ N+ that the equations in Fig. 29
define a function †n : F (n) →F (n). The equations defining †n are obtained from
those in Fig. 29 as follows: the † on the left-hand side of an equation is to be replaced
by †n , each † on the right-hand side of an equation is to be replaced by †n−1, and any
equation that then contains †0 on its right-hand side is to be omitted. It is easy to see
that †1 is well-defined, and it is similarly easy to argue that †n+1 is well-defined if †n
is well-defined. The latter argument requires us to prove that our equations in Fig. 29
are depth-respecting, which is a dull exercise in unravelling definitions and reasoning
with inequalities. To get a flavor for these arguments, see Fig. 30. Arguments for some
of the other inequalities can be found by adapting Figs. 4 (2–4, 6) from Renne (2008a);
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Fig. 30 Proof that d
([U ◦ U ′, (u, u′)]ϕ) < d ([U, u][U ′, u′]ϕ)
arguments for the remaining inequalities are not too difficult to obtain. We therefore
have by induction on n ∈ N+ that †n is well-defined for each n ∈ N+. Next, we define
a function † mapping formulas to formulas by setting ϕ† := ϕ†d(ϕ) and then argue that
† is the unique function satisfying the equations in Fig. 29.10
All that remains is for us to argue by induction on formula depth that ϕ ⇔∗ ϕ†.
Almost all of the cases are straightforward adaptations of the standard arguments
in Dynamic Epistemic Logic van Ditmarsch et al. (2007), with the exception of the
following cases that we handle in detail.
– Case Biψ .
Since † is depth-respecting, we have d(ψ) < d(Biψ) and hence that ψ ⇔∗ ψ†
by the induction hypothesis. Thus Biψ ⇔∗ Biψ† by modal reasoning (using
Lemma 4.3 instead of Rule BN). Since Biψ† = (Biψ)†, it follows that Biψ ⇔∗
(Biψ)†.
– Case [U, u]Biψ .




over S is equal to . It therefore follows by Axiom U3 and classical propositional
reasoning that [U, u]Biψ ⇔∗ , and it follows by the definition of † and clas-
sical propositional reasoning that ([U, u]Biψ)† ⇔∗ . We therefore have that
[U, u]Biψ ⇔∗ ([U, u]Biψ)†, as desired.
10 In a bit more detail, making frequent use of the fact that the equations in Fig. 29 are depth-respecting,
we proceed in the following way. First, we argue by induction on n ∈ N+ that for each ϕ ∈ F (n) and
each k ∈ N, we have ϕ†d(ϕ) = ϕ†d(ϕ)+k . Using this, we argue that the function † defined by ϕ† := ϕ†d(ϕ)
satisfies the equations in Fig. 29. Finally, we argue by induction on n ∈ N+ that if r : F → F is another
function satisfying the equations in Fig. 29, then ϕr = ϕ† for each ϕ ∈ F (n).
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So suppose S = ∅ and hence that there is a v ∈ S. Since † is depth-respecting,
we have d(pU (u)) < d([U, u]Biψ) and d([U, v]ψ) < d([U, u]Biψ) and hence
that pU (u) ⇔∗ (pU (u))† and [U, v]ψ ⇔∗ ([U, v]ψ)† by the induction hypothe-
sis. Applying modal reasoning (using Lemma 4.3 instead of Rule BN), we have
pU (u) ⇔∗ (pU (u))† and Bi [U, v]ψ ⇔∗ Bi ([U, v]ψ)†. Since v ∈ S was chosen
arbitrarily, it follows by Axiom U3, the definition of †, and classical propositional
reasoning that [U, u]Biψ ⇔∗ ([U, u]Biψ)†, as desired.
– Case [U, u](t i ψ).
Since † is depth-respecting, we have d(pU (u))< d([U, u](t i ψ)) and hence
that pU (u) ⇔∗ (pU (u))† by the induction hypothesis. Applying classical
propositional reasoning and Axiom U4, it follows that [U, u](t i ψ) ⇔∗
([U, u](t i ψ))†. 
unionsq
We have therefore shown that every formulaϕ can be reduced to a JLCE∗-equivalent
formula ϕ†.
6 Semantics
The semantics of UL is our adaptation of a Kripke-style semantics for Justification
Logic due to Fitting (2005) and Mkrtychev (1997).
Definition 6.1 To say that M is a Fitting model means that M is a tuple (W M , RM ,
V M , AM ) whose components satisfy the following.
– W M is a nonempty set whose members are called worlds (in M).
– RU : A → ℘(W U × W U ) assigns a transitive binary relation RUi ⊆ W U × W U
on W U to each agent i ∈ A .
– V U : P → ℘(W U ) assigns a set V U (p) of worlds in M to each propositional
letter p ∈ P .
– AU : A → (T × F → ℘(W U )) assigns a set Ai (t, ϕ) of worlds in M to
each term-agent-formula triple (t, i, ϕ) ∈ T × A × F subject to the following
schematic conditions that together make a function of type A → (T × F →
℘(W U )) an evidence function.
Constant Specification: c ∈ C and AX 	 ϕ imply AMi (c, ϕ) = W M .
Application: AMi (t, ϕ → ψ) ∩ AMi (s, ϕ) ⊆ AMi (t ·ϕ s, ψ).
Sum: AMi (t, ϕ) ∪ AMi (s, ϕ) ⊆ AMi (t + s, ϕ).
Checker: AMi (t, ϕ) ⊆ AMi (!t, t :i ϕ).
Monotonicity: RMi  and  ∈ AMi (t, ϕ) imply  ∈ AMi (t, ϕ).
A pointed Fitting model is a pair (M, ) consisting of a Fitting model M and a world
 ∈ W U ; is said to be the point of (M, ).
Definition 6.2 (Truth) Given a pointed Fitting model (M, ) and a formula ϕ ∈ F ,
we write M,  | ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at (M, ); the negation of M,  | ϕ is
written M,  | ϕ. We define when it is that a formula is true at a pointed Fitting
model according to the following induction on formula depth.
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– M,  | pk means that  ∈ V M (pk).
– M,  | ⊥.
– M,  | ϕ1 → ϕ2 means that M,  | ϕ1 or M,  | ϕ2.
– M,  | Biϕ means that M, | ϕ for each  ∈ W M with RMi .
– M,  | t i ϕ means that  ∈ AMi (t, ϕ).
– M,  | [U, u]ϕ means that either M,  | pU (u) or else both M,  | pU (u)
and M[U ], (, u) | ϕ, where the components of the tuple M[U ] are defined as
follows.
W M[U ] := {(, v) ∈ W M × W U | M, | pU (v)}
RM[U ]i := {((, v), (′, v′)) | RMi ′ & vRUi v′}
AM[U ]i (t, ψ) := {(, v) |  ∈ AMi (t, ψ) & U, v  (t, i, ψ)}
V M[U ](pk) := {(, v) |  ∈ V M (pk)}
To say that ϕ ∈ F is valid, written | ϕ, means that we have M,  | ϕ for each
pointed Fitting model (M, ).
Lemma 6.3 (Update Correctness) Let (M, ) be a pointed Fitting model and (U, u)
be a pointed update frame. If M,  | pU (u), then M[U ] is a Fitting model.
Proof W M[U ] is nonempty because M,  | pU (u). RM[U ]i is transitive because each
of RMi and R
U
i is transitive. To prove that A
M[U ] is an evidence function, we check
each of the defining properties in turn.
– Constant Specification: c ∈ C and AX 	 ϕ imply AM[U ]i (c, ϕ) = W M[U ].
Suppose c ∈ C and AX 	 ϕ. Choose an arbitrary (, v) ∈ W M[U ]. We have
that  ∈ AMi (c, ϕ) because AM is an evidence function. Further, we have U, v 
(c, i, ϕ) (see Fig. 1). Hence (, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (ck, ϕ) by the definition of AM[U ]i .
– Application: AM[U ]i (t, ϕ → ψ) ∩ AM[U ]i (s, ϕ) ⊆ AM[U ]i (t ·ϕ s, ψ).
Suppose (, v)∈ AM[U ]i (t, ϕ → ψ) ∩ AM[U ]i (s, ϕ). It follows by the definition
of AM[U ]i that  ∈ AMi (t, ϕ → ψ) ∩ AMi (s, ϕ), U, v  (t, i, ϕ → ψ), and
U, v  (s, i, ϕ). The first of these items implies  ∈ AMi (t ·ϕ s) because AM
is an evidence function. The second two of the three items together imply that
U, v  (t ·ϕ s, i, ψ) (see Fig. 1). But the latter and  ∈ AMi (t ·ϕ s) together imply
that (, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (t ·ϕ s, ψ) by the definition of AM[U ]i .
– Sum: AM[U ]i (t, ϕ)∪AM[U ]i (s, ϕ) ⊆ AM[U ]i (t+s, ϕ). Similar to the argument for
Application.
– Checker: AM[U ]i (t, ϕ) ⊆ AM[U ]i (!t, t :i ϕ). Similar to the argument for Application.
– Monotonicity: (, v)RM[U ]i (′, v′) and (, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (t, ϕ) imply (′, v′) ∈
AM[U ]i (t, ϕ).
Suppose (, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (t, ϕ) and (, v)RM[U ]i (′, v′). It follows that  ∈
AMi (t, ϕ) and U, v  (t, i, ϕ) by the definition of A
M[U ]





′ by the definition of RM[U ]i . Since AM is an evidence function, it follows
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that ′ ∈ Ai (t, ϕ). Since U, v  (t, i, ϕ) and vRUi v′, it follows by Lemma 3.7 that
U, v′  (t, i, ϕ). But the latter and ′ ∈ AMi (t, ϕ) together imply that (′, v′) ∈




In the definition of truth (Definition 6.2), the cases for formulas having the form
[U, u]ϕ delegate part of their work to the U -calculus (Fig. 1). This may seem strange
because we are admitting the U -calculus—a syntactic notion—into our semantics.
However, it is our intention for evidence eliminations to respect the intended mean-
ings of the term-forming operations (described earlier in the Sect. 3). This ensures that
the elimination of one or more parts of a combination t of multiple pieces of evidence
shall affect t itself. Therefore, some simple theory describing the logical consequences
that the elimination of a simple term has on more complex terms is a necessary part
of the semantics. One may also take some comfort in the fact that the U -calculus is a
simple, decidable theory.
Definition 6.4 (Isomorphism) To say that f is an isomorphism between Fitting models
M and M ′ means that f is a function of type W M → W M ′ satisfying each of the follow-
ing: f is a bijection,RMi  if and only if f ()RM
′
i f () for each (,) ∈ W M×W M
and each i ∈ A ,  ∈ V M (p) if and only if f () ∈ V M ′(p) for each  ∈ W M and
each p ∈ P , and  ∈ AMi (t, ψ) if and only if f () ∈ AM
′
i (t, ψ) for each  ∈ W M
and each (t, i, ψ) ∈ T × A × F .
Theorem 6.5 (Isomorphism Equivalence) For each isomorphism f between Fitting
models M and M ′, each formula ϕ ∈ F , and each pointed update frame (U, u) ∈ U
such that there exists an 	 ∈ W M satisfying M,	 | pU (u) and M ′, f (	) | pU (u),
we have each of the following items.
1. M,  | ϕ if and only if M ′, f () | ϕ for each  ∈ W M .
2. f U : W M[U ] → W M ′[U ] defined by setting f U (, v) := ( f (), v) is an isomor-
phism between M[U ] and M ′[U ].
Proof By induction on n := max{d(U ), d(ϕ)} ∈ N+. The base case n = 1 is vacu-
ously true because d(U ) ≥ 2. So we proceed to the induction case. Item 6.5 is proved
by considering the possible syntactic forms that ϕ might have. First, if ϕ has one of
the forms q ∈ P ∪ {⊥}, ψ → χ , or Biψ , then the argument is just as in modal logic
(Blackburn et al. 2001). So let us consider the remaining forms that ϕ ∈ F might
have.
– Case: ϕ has the form t i ψ .
M,  | t i ψ means that  ∈ AMi (t, ψ). Since f is an isomorphism between
M and M ′, the latter holds if and only if f () ∈ AM ′i (t, ψ). But this is what it
means to have M ′, f () | t i ψ .
– Case: ϕ has the form [U ′, u′]ψ .
Since d(pU ′(u′)) < d([U ′, u′]ψ), it follows by the induction hypothesis that
M,  | pU ′(u′) if and only if M ′, f () | pU ′(u′). Further, under the assump-
tion that both M,  | pU ′(u′) and M ′, f () | pU ′(u′), since d(U ′) <
d([U ′, u′]ψ), it follows by the induction hypothesis that f U ′ is an isomorphism
between M[U ′] and M ′[U ′] and hence that M[U ′], (, u′) | ψ if and only if
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M ′[U ′], ( f (), u′) | ψ . Applying the definition of truth (Definition 6.2) and
the definition of f U ′ , we have proved that M,  | [U ′, u′]ψ if and only if
M ′, f () | [U ′, u′]ψ .
This completes the proof of Item 6.5. To prove Item 6.5, we prove that f U is an
isomorphism between M[U ] and M ′[U ].
– f U is a bijection.
First, we argue that f U is surjective. Proceeding, (′, v) ∈ W M ′[U ] means that
M ′,′ | pU (v). Since f is surjective, there is a  ∈ W M such that f () = ′.
Further, since d(pU (v)) < d(U ), it follows by the induction hypothesis that
M ′, f () | pU (v) if and only if M, | pU (v). But the latter is what it means
to have (, v) ∈ W M[U ]. Since f U (, v) = ( f (), v) = (′, v), we have
shown that f U is surjective.
We now argue that f U is injective. Proceeding, assume that
f U (1, v1) = f U (2, v2) .
It follows by the definition of f U that f (1) = f (2) and v1 = v2. Since f is
injective, it follows that 1 = 2 and v1 = v2. So f U is injective.
– (, v)RM[U ]i (′, v′) if and only if f U (, v)RM
′[U ]
i f U (′, v).




. Since f is an isomorphism,
the latter is equivalent to f ()RM ′i f (′) and vRUi v′, which is what it means to
have f U (, v)RM ′[U ]i f U (′, v).
– (, v) ∈ V M[U ](pk) if and only if f U (, v) ∈ V M ′[U ](pk).
(, v) ∈ V M[U ](pk) means that  ∈ V M (pk). Since f is an isomorphism,
the latter is equivalent to f () ∈ V M ′(pk). But this is what it means to have
f U (, v) ∈ V M ′[U ](pk).
– (, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (t, ψ) if and only if f U (, v) ∈ AM
′[U ]
i (t, ψ).
(, v) ∈ AM[U ]i (t, ψ) means that  ∈ AMi (t, ψ) and U, v  (t, i, ψ). Since f is
an isomorphism, the latter conjunction is equivalent to the statement that f () ∈
AM ′i (t, ψ) and U, v  (t, i, ψ). But this is what it means to have f U (, v) ∈
AM
′[U ]
i (t, ψ). 
unionsq
Theorem 6.6 (Soundness) 	 ϕ implies | ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F .
Proof By Admissibility (Theorem 4.13), it suffices for us to prove that 	∗ ϕ implies |
ϕ. Proceeding, we first prove that AX 	 χ implies | χ by induction on the length of
AX derivations. In the base case, we must check each of the AX-axioms. Most of the
arguments for these axioms are straightforward, making use of standard arguments in
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007) or the fact that the function AM
in a Fitting model M satisfies the defining properties of an evidence function. Perhaps
the trickiest Axiom is U5, so we shall handle this axiom in detail.
– Axiom U5 is sound; that is, | [U, u][U ′, u′]ϕ ↔ [U ◦ U ′, (u, u′)]ϕ.
While much of this argument is standard in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007), the Justification Logic-specific aspects of AX intro-
duce some complications, so we shall handle this argument in full. Let (M, )
123 [404]
Synthese (2012) 185:43–82 75
be a pointed Fitting model. We may assume without loss of generality that
M,  | ¬[U, u]¬pU ′(u′) (for the result otherwise follows easily by the definition
of truth, Definition 6.2). Proceeding, it suffices by Isomorphism Equivalence (The-
orem 6.5) and the definition of truth (Definition 6.2) for us to prove that the function
f : W M[U ][U ′] → W M[U◦U ′] defined by setting f ((, v), v′) := (, (v, v′)) is
an isomorphism between M[U ][U ′] and M[U ◦ U ′].
• f is a bijection.
((, v), v′) ∈ W M[U ][U ′] if and only if M, | ¬[U, v]¬pU ′(v′). But the
latter is equivalent to the statement that (, (v, v′)) ∈ W M[U◦U ′].
• 	1 RM[U ][U ′]i 	2 if and only if f (	1)RM[U◦U
′]
i f (	2).
We have ((, v), v′)RM[U ][U
′]
i ((	,w),w
′) if and only if RMi 	, vR
U
i w,





• 	 ∈ V M[U ][U ′](pk) if and only if f (	) ∈ V M[U◦U ′](pk).
((, v), v′) ∈ V M[U ][U ′](pk) and (, (v, v′)) ∈ V M[U◦U ′](pk) are each
equivalent to the statement that  ∈ V M (pk).
• 	 ∈ AM[U ][U ′]i (t, ψ) if and only if f (	) ∈ AM[U◦U
′]
i (t, ψ).
((, v), v′) ∈ AM[U ][U ′]i (t, ψ) means that  ∈ AMi (t, ψ), U, v  (t, i, ψ),
and U ′, v′  (t, i, ψ). Applying Composition (Lemma 3.11), we have  ∈
Ai (t, ψ) and (U ◦ U ′), (v, v′)  (t, i, ψ). But this is what it means to have
(, (v, v′)) ∈ AM[U◦U ′]i (t, ψ).
Conclusion: Axiom U5 is valid.
We have argued that each AX-axiom is valid. For the induction case, assume we
derived AX 	 ck :i ϕ by Rule CN from AX-theorem ϕ. By the induction hypothe-
sis, | ϕ. Letting (M, ) be a pointed Fitting model, | ϕ implies M, | ϕ for
each  ∈ W M satisfying RMi . Further, since ϕ is an AX-theorem, it follows that
 ∈ AMi (ck, ϕ) because AM is an evidence function. Therefore M,  | ck :i ϕ. Since
(M, ) was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that | ck :i ϕ. Conclusion: AX 	 ϕ
implies | ϕ. By the standard argument for the validity of Rule MP (Blackburn et al.
2001), it therefore follows that 	∗ ϕ implies | ϕ. 
unionsq
Theorem 6.7 (Consistency) JLCE is consistent; that is,  ⊥.
Proof Define the Fitting model M by setting W M := {}, RMi := {(, )} for each
i ∈ A , V M (p) := ∅ for each p ∈ P , and AMi (t, ϕ) = W M for each (t, i, ϕ) ∈
T × A × F . (Note that M is indeed a Fitting model: W M is nonempty, RMi is tran-
sitive for each i ∈ A , and AM is an evidence function.) Since M,  | ⊥, it follows
by Soundness (Theorem 6.6) that  ⊥. 
unionsq
Theorem 6.8 (Completeness) | ϕ implies 	 ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F .
Proof Since JLCE∗ is a subsystem of JLCE, it suffices for us to argue that | ϕ
implies 	∗ ϕ. Our proof proceeds by a canonical model argument, so let us first make
some preliminary definitions. Let S be a set of formulas. If S is finite, then we define
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∧
S :=
{ if S = ∅,∧
ψ∈S ψ otherwise.
To say that S is inconsistent means that there is a finite subset S′ ⊆ S such that
	∗ (∧ S′) → ⊥. To say that S is consistent means that S is not inconsistent. To say
that S is maximal consistent means that S is consistent and adding any formula not
already present in S will result in a set that is inconsistent. By a Lindenbaum Argu-
ment, any consistent set of formulas may be extended to a maximal consistent set
of formulas. The canonical model is the structure M∗ := (W ∗, R∗, V ∗, A∗) whose
components are defined as follows.
– W ∗ is the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas.
– R∗ : A → ℘(W ∗ × W ∗) is defined by
R∗i := {(,) ∈ W ∗ × W ∗ | ∀ϕ ∈ F : Biϕ ∈  implies ϕ ∈ } .
– A∗ : A → (T × F → ℘(W ∗)) is defined by setting
A∗i (t, ϕ) := { ∈ W ∗ | (t i ϕ) ∈ } .
– V ∗ : P → ℘(W ∗) is defined by setting V (p) := { ∈ W ∗ | p ∈ }.
To see that M∗ is in fact a Fitting model: W ∗ is nonempty because the set  of all
formulas true at the pointed Fitting model (M, ) from the proof of Theorem 6.7
is maximal consistent; for each i ∈ A , the relation R∗i is transitive by the standard
argument in modal logic Blackburn et al. (2001); A∗ is an evidence function by Rule
AX, classical propositional reasoning, and Axioms E1–E4.
The key property of M∗ that we now wish to prove is the Truth Lemma: for each
ϕ ∈ F and each  ∈ W ∗, we have that ϕ ∈  if and only if M∗,  | ϕ. The proof
is by induction on formula depth.
– Cases q ∈ P ∪{⊥}, ϕ → ψ , and Biϕ follow by the standard arguments in modal
logic (Blackburn et al. 2001).
– Case t i ϕ.
By the definition of A∗, we have (t i ϕ) ∈  if and only if  ∈ A∗i (t, ϕ). But
the latter is what it means to have M∗,  | t i ϕ.
– Case [U, u]ϕ.
[U, u]ϕ ∈  is equivalent to ([U, u]ϕ)† ∈  by Reduction (Theorem 5.2) and the
maximal consistency of . By the induction hypothesis, we have ([U, u]ϕ)† ∈  if
and only if M∗,  | ([U, u]ϕ)†. Applying Soundness (Theorem 6.6), Reduction
(Theorem 5.2), and the definition of truth (Definition 6.2), it follows M∗,  |
([U, u]ϕ)† is equivalent to M∗,  | [U, u]ϕ.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. The completeness argument is then
easy: suppose ∗ χ . It follows that {¬χ} is consistent and so may be extended to a
maximal consistent set  ∈ W M∗ . Since ¬χ ∈ , it follows by the Truth Lemma that
M∗,  | ¬χ and thus that M∗,  | χ by the definition of truth (Definition 6.2).
Since M∗ is a Fitting model, we have shown that ∗ χ implies | χ . It follows that
| χ implies 	∗ χ . 
unionsq
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We conclude this section with a theorem that provides an important connection
between JLCE and the U -calculus. The theorem tells us that whenever 	 t i ϕ, it
is not possible to eliminate agent i’s evidence t relevant to ϕ. (See our discussion in
Remark 3.6.)
Theorem 6.9 (Non-Elimination) 	 t i ϕ implies U, u  (t, i, ϕ).
Proof It follows by Soundness (Theorem 6.6) that 	 t i ϕ implies | t i ϕ. Let M
be the Fitting model from the proof of Consistency (Theorem 6.7). Suppose toward a
contradiction that we have U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ) for some (U, u) ∈ U . Since the derivability
of U, u 	 (t, i, ϕ) does not depend on the value of pU (u), we could then assume with-
out loss of generality that pU (u) = . Applying the definition of truth (Definition 6.2),
we would then have that  /∈ AM[U ]i (t, ϕ) and hence that M[U ], (, u) | t i ϕ,
contradicting the fact that | t i ϕ. 
unionsq
7 Formalized example
We now use JLCE to formalize our email example from the beginning of this paper.
Since we are interested only in the evidence and beliefs of Bob (B) and Charlie
(C), we define our set A of agents by A := {B,C}. We let O (“open”) abbreviate
propositional letter p0 and C (“cheese”) abbreviate propositional letter p1, and we
write O → C (“open implies cheese”) to describe Anne’s plan to bring the cheese if
the store is open. Email messages x1 through x4 provide us with our initial setup X ,
a conjunction of the formulas
– x1 :B (O → C) (“x1 is Bob’s evidence that O → C”),
– x1 :C (O → C) (“x1 is Charlie’s evidence that O → C”),
– x2 :B (x1 :C (O → C)) (“x2 is Bob’s evidence that x1 :C (O → C)”),
– x3 :B O (“x3 is Bob’s evidence that O”),
– x3 :C O (“x3 is Charlie’s evidence that O”), and
– x4 :B (x3 :C O) (“x4 is Bob’s evidence that x3 :C O”).
It follows by classical propositional reasoning and Lemma 4.1 that 	 X → (x1 ·O
x3) :B C and 	 X → (x1 ·O x3) :C C ; that is, given our setup X , each of Bob and
Charlie has evidence x1 ·O x3 that Anne is bringing the cheese.
Let us now look at Bob’s evidence about Charlie’s evidence. First, it follows by
Lemma 4.1 and Internalization (Theorem 4.14) that there is a term t such that
	 t :B (x1 :C (O → C) → (x3 :C O → (x1 ·O x3) :C C)) . (5)
Defining the term s by setting
s := (t ·(x1 :C (O→C)) x2) ·(x3 :C O) x4 ,
it follows by Lemma 4.1 and classical propositional reasoning that
	 X → s :B (x1 ·O x3) :C C ; (6)
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Fig. 31 The update frame PRI(k,ϕ)i
that is, “given setup X , Bob has evidence s that Charlie has evidence x1 ·O x3 that C .”
So from the initial situation X given by messages x1 through x4, each of Bob and Char-
lie has evidence x1 ·O x3 that Anne is bringing the cheese, and Bob has evidence s
that Charlie has evidence x1 ·O x3 that Anne is bringing the cheese.
Now let us examine how Anne’s private email x5 to Bob affects Bob’s evidence.
Adapting the Dynamic Epistemic Logic definition of the private announcement to an
agent (described in the introduction; see also: Baltag and Moss (2004); Renne (2008b);
van Ditmarsch et al. (2007)), we define the update frame PRI(k,ϕ)i , called the private
elimination of agent i’s evidence xk relevant to ϕ, as follows.
W PRI
(k,ϕ)








j := {(u, v), (v, v)} if j = i
pPRI
(k,ϕ)
i (w) :=  for w ∈ {u, v}
vPRI
(k,ϕ)
i (u) := {(xk, i, ϕ)}
vPRI
(k,ϕ)
i (v) := ∅
We picture PRI(k,ϕ)i in Fig. 31. We will use the update (PRI
(3,O)
B , u) to represent the
effect of Anne’s final message x5. Using PR to denote the use of classical propositional
reasoning, we then have the following.
1. PRI(3,O)B , u 	 (x3,B, O)
By Axiom EV of the PRI(3,O)B -calculus (Fig. 1).
2. PRI(3,O)B , u 	 (x1 ·O x3,B, C)
By line 1 and Rule EAR of the PRI(3,O)B -calculus (Fig. 1).
3. 	 [PRI(3,O)B , u] ((x1 ·O x3)B C) → ⊥
By line 2, Axiom U4 (with pPRI(3,0)B (u) = ), and PR.
4. [PRI(3,O)B , u] ((x1 ·O x3)B C) → [PRI(3,0)B , u]⊥
By line 3, Axiom U1 (with pPRI(3,0)B (u) = ), and PR.
5. 	 [PRI(3,O)B , u]¬ ((x1 ·O x3)B C)
By line 4, Axiom U2, and PR.
6. 	 [PRI(3,O)B , u]¬ ((x1 ·O x3)B C) → [PRI(3,O)B , u]¬ ((x1 ·O x3) :B C)
By Def. 3.4, PR, Rule UN, and Axiom U2.
7. 	 [PRI(3,O)B , u]¬ ((x1 ·O x3) :B C)
By lines 5 and 6 and Rule MP.
This is, after Anne’s private message to Bob eliminating Bob’s evidence x3 rel-
evant to O , it is not the case that x1 ·O x3 is Bob’s evidence that C (Anne brings
the cheese). And yet we have the following.
8. PRI(3,O)B , u  (t,B, x1 :C (O → C) → (x3 :C O → (x1 ·O x3) :C C))
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By (5), Def. 3.4, PR, and Non-Elimination (Theorem 6.9).
9. PRI(3,O)B , u  (x2,B, x1 :C (O → C))
Inspection of the PRI(3,0)B -calculus (Fig. 1).
10. PRI(3,O)B , u  (x4,B, x3 :C O)
Inspection of the PRI(3,0)B -calculus (Fig. 1).
11. PRI(3,O)B , u  (s,B, (x1 ·O x3) :C C)
By lines 8, 9, and 10 and inspection of the PRI(3,0)B -calculus.
12. 	 X → s B (x1 ·O x3) :C C
By (6), Def. 3.4, and PR.
13. 	 X → [PRI(3,O)B , u]s B (x1 ·O x3) :C C
By lines 11 and 12, Axiom U4 (with pPRI(3,O)B ,u(u) = ), and PR.
14. 	 X → BB(x1 ·O x3) :C C
By (6), Def. 3.4, and PR.
15. 	 X → [PRI(3,O)B , u]BB(x1 ·O x3) :C C
By line 14, Axiom U3 (with pPRI(3,O)B ,u(u) =  and RPRI
(3,O)
B
B (u) = {(u, u)}),
and PR.
16. 	 X → [PRI(3,O)B , u]s :B (x1 ·O x3) :C C
By lines 13 and 15, Def. 3.4, Axiom U2, and PR.
In words: given setup X , after Anne’s private message to Bob eliminating Bob’s evi-
dence x3 relevant to O , it is (still) the case that Bob has evidence s that Charlie has
evidence x1 ·O x3 that Anne will bring the cheese (line 16), despite the fact that Bob
himself does not consider x1 ·O x3 evidence that Anne will bring the cheese (line 7).
8 Conclusion
The work in this paper is part of a larger project, Dynamic Justification Logic, whose
aim is to combine the frameworks of Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Justification Logic
in order to reason about belief and evidence dynamics arising from multi-agent com-
munications. The role of this paper in the project is to introduce multi-agent evidence
elimination, one kind of dynamic operation on multi-agent evidence that causes an
agent to set aside a piece of evidence relevant to a given assertion and then determine
how this affects other pieces of evidence as a result of the ways in which evidence
may be logically combined in Justification Logic. In earlier work (Renne 2008a), the
author studied a notion of evidence introduction, whereby a piece of evidence may
be introduced as relevant for a given assertion; however, the particular operation the
author defined there lacks the tight integration with the semantics of Dynamic Episte-
mic Logic used for evidence elimination in this paper, and so the techniques developed
here might well be adapted to a notion of multi-agent evidence introduction as well.
Yavorskaya (2008) studied the first multi-agent languages for Justification Logic.
Yavorskaya’s multi-agent languages are based on a variation of the basic fragment of
UL. The variation may be obtained from the basic fragment of UL by making cer-
tain changes to the term-formation grammar in G0, including, among other changes,
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the creation of a superscript-labeled copy t i of each term t for each agent i ∈ A
and the requirement that a colon-formula t :i ϕ is well-formed if and only if t is a
term si labeled by the superscript of agent i . Yavorskaya’s work investigates certain
“interactions” between the terms of different agents, in the sense of acceptance of prin-
ciples such as t i :i ϕ → (! ji t i ) j : j (t i :i ϕ) (“agent j can check agent i’s evidence”)
or t i :i ϕ → (↑ ji t i ) j : j ϕ (“agent j trusts agent i’s evidence”). Such interactions are
essentially static because the Yavorskaya languages lack update models, and hence the
interaction principles endorsed by a given model for a Yavorskaya-language remain
fixed once and for all. By way of contrast, update modals allow UL to describe tran-
sitions between models that bring about changes in the agents’ evidence and beliefs,
which is an essentially dynamic notion. So it would be natural to investigate “dynamic”
versions of Yavorskaya’s languages and principles, though this is something we leave
for future work. Further, the exact connection between languages with Yavorskaya-
style terms (where each agent has his or her own disjoint set of terms) and languages
with UL-style terms (where the agents share a single set of terms) is not yet well under-
stood. In particular, a natural question for future research is the following “multi-agent
realization” question: given a sub-theory T of our theory JLCE such that T is in the
basic fragment of UL, is there a theory T ′ in an appropriate Yavorskaya-style language
such that every T -theorem can be converted into (or “realized as”) a T ′-theorem by
adding agent superscripts to terms and, conversely, every T ′-theorem can be converted
into a T -theorem by omitting all agent superscripts? The author conjectures that this
“multi-agent realization” question has an affirmative answer, though investigation of
this question is left for future work.
Beyond the operations of evidence elimination and introduction, there are a
number of natural directions in which one might proceed, including the introduc-
tion of preferences and preference change over evidence, which would allow us to tie
an agent’s beliefs (or the relative strength among his or her various beliefs) to his or her
preference ordering on evidence. This work would naturally dovetail and complement
recent work in Dynamic Epistemic Logic on Belief Revision and preference upgrade
(Baltag and Smets 2007; van Benthem 2004; van Benthem and Liu 2007). It might also
be interesting to compare the semantic topologic-based approach to evidence recently
proposed by van Benthem and Pacuit (2011) to the present Justification Logic-style
syntactic notion of evidence. Indeed, there notions similar to evidence elimination
(and introduction) are studied for a less syntactical point of view.
Finally, our work has natural connections with the leaner public announcement-
based Justification Logic system of evidence introduction due to Bucheli et al. (2010).
The latter work is focused on finding the Justification Logic analog of Plaza’s modal
logic of public announcements. The key in this work is to take the agent’s evidence t
about the truth of a statement ψ after the hypothetical future announcement of ϕ as
sufficient for the agent having t as evidence for ψ after ϕ is in fact announced. Thus
the key evidence introduction schema (in multi-agent format) is
t :i (ϕ → [ϕ]ψ) → [ϕ]t :i ψ .
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In a follow-up paper by Bucheli et al. (2011), this approach is varied by having a certain
piece of evidence ⇑t that is derived from t as support for ψ after the announcement,
leading to the evidence introduction schema (again in multi-agent format)
t :i (ϕ → [ϕ]ψ) → [ϕ]⇑t :i ψ .
The latter is more in the spirit of (a static variation of) the generalized step-by-step
inference-based reasoning studied by Velázquez-Quesada (2009), which itself sug-
gests a number of interesting new dynamic operations on evidence for future study.
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